billion and is likely to continue to decrease. As a percentage of Gross National Product, U.S. defense spending is at an all time low of about 2.5 percent.
In a 1993 speech to defense company executives at a dinner dubbed "The Last Supper" by Lockheed Martin CEO Norman Augustine, former U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry stressed the need for consolidation. He stated that the Pentagon simply cannot continue to pay huge sums to sustain the unused excess capacity that had emerged in the defense industry. 3 In response to DoD suggestions many companies decided to shed defense-related activities and concentrate instead on civilian and consumer markets. In contrast a few companies decided to stay in defense and to grow.
However, this move to grow by acquiring suppliers (and/or competitors) is not typical in today's environment, in which U.S. industry has been in the process of streamlining, downsizing, and outsourcing with suppliers for parts and services.
The companies remaining in the U.S. defense industry argue that they need to be large in order to remain flexible, win contracts, and have enough money to support the acquisition or development of technologies that will keep them competitive in the future. The Pentagon can cut budgets and programs faster than small companies can react, and the impact of specific cutbacks on a small firm's revenue can be sudden and severe. However, a large company can more easily adjust to change by reallocating its resources through a plan of diversification that can absorb a cutback or cancellation of a program. 4 The more diversified a company's base, the less likely that any single government cutback will impair profitability. A few major defense companies, like Raytheon and Lockheed Martin, the subjects of our analyses, have therefore adopted the pursuit of "massive critical mass (!)" as a means of establishing a sustainable competitive advantage. Smaller companies are selling off their defense-related capabilities and technologies to larger companies that are seeking horizontal and vertical integration in the manufacturing of their own product lines. Acquiring a core supplier, who might otherwise vanish for lack of sufficient sales volume, is one way of assuring the availability of critical components and access to critical technologies. In the current environment of the defense industry, alliances, joint ventures, and direct contracting cannot by themselves necessarily ensure that the supply of important components and technologies will endure.
While this approach of acquisition stems from a corporate strategy for survival, it creates unique opportunities to expand portfolios of technology competencies. Larger companies, by marrying complementary technologies through mergers and acquisitions, will compete more effectively in multiple markets and can service a wide range of needs in the U.S. and abroad. For example, combining radar technology with an acquired missile technology, or integrating newly acquired electronics into the design and manufacturing of an aircraft or weapons system, potentially enables more efficient use of resources. It also spawns families of products with commonalities at the component level. Within the constraints of export rules large U.S. companies can be attractive to foreign countries that wish to strengthen their own defense positions but lack either the internal capability of doing so, or the managerial skills to integrate a system from a multitude of independent contractors. Many foreign governments seek out and rely on U.S. companies that can provide "systems of systems", that is, complete turnkey packages of hardware and services that are not otherwise available. This need applies not just to military systems but also to some civilian applications (air traffic control, maritime navigation, telecommunications). Wisely acquired and properly integrated the technologies and capabilities can stimulate markets and generate new business opportunities.
The size and financial strength of U.S. defense companies pose an increasingly formidable challenge to the divided and frequently unprofitable European defense industry, which is subsidized directly by the participating governments. 5 Consolidation of U.S. defense companies potentially makes them more profitable and competitive because of economies of scale and the advantages gained from merging technologies. However, these apparent gains will have to contend with limited defense markets in the future. There will certainly be fewer DoD procurements. Since defense dollars are becoming more scarce and are extended over longer periods, development cycles will likewise be longer. DoD will need contractors with the financial stability and willingness to endure extended periods of low returns. A large diverse company will capture more of these new programs than will a small highly focused company. Likewise, the larger firm is better able to develop and test new technologies and production techniques while keeping the necessary engineering and manufacturing talent engaged.
The DoD would like to encourage and control an orderly downsizing and restructuring of the defense industry. To that end the government is likely to allow the merging companies to recover their acquisition costs if there are demonstrable savings to the government. The corporate challenge for these companies is to reshape themselves while preserving competitiveness, reducing costs, maintaining quality, and creating value for their shareholders. It is partly through the strategic balance and use of technology that this challenge can be met.
2.0
Raytheon: A Description of the Corporation.
The Raytheon Company was founded in 1922 by Laurence Marshall and Charles Smith. The company was originally called the American Appliance Company and intended to produce refrigeration equipment. However, the founders became interested in vacuum tubes and never fully developed their refrigeration technologies. Instead, the company found a more lucrative niche in electronic devices and in 1925 changed its name to the more impressive and modern sounding title of Raytheon Incorporated. Vannevar Bush, former chairman of MIT, was an early mover in Raytheon's shift with his founding participation in Submarine Signal Company, a key component of the initial Raytheon. (The founders might not be surprised to learn that after 75 years Raytheon has recently sold off much of its appliance Raytheon's strategy of business diversification is a distinguishing company feature, supported by the current CEO Dennis J. Picard. In addition to providing a stabilizing influence to fluctuations in government spending, the commercial market offers a viable opportunity to leverage technologies and products originally developed for the defense market. In the 1995 annual report Picard stated that Raytheon will remain a diversified company by "continuing to apply defense technologies in commercial markets on a selective basis where there is a good match between our technology and commercial market opportunity". But by 1997 the opportunities had shifted sufficiently that the appliance selloff is now occurring.
Although Raytheon had followed a strategy of diversification for the past 30 years, in the decade of the 1990s the company has aggressively pursued defense consolidation. Following Secretary Perry's advice at the "Last Supper" Raytheon completed a major internal reorganization to create its primary electronics division, Raytheon Electronic Systems (RES). The company has had five significant acquisitions related to defense electronics. The most recent is the proposed mega-merger with Hughes Aircraft that dramatically increases Raytheon's size and financial clout. The pertinent details of Raytheon's recent acquisitions are summarized in Table 2-1.
2.1
Ravtheon: Technology Strategy. perspective. This value was described by CEO Picard in press releases immediately after the acquisition, and was similarly acknowledged by Raytheon executives during our research interviews.
Another interesting observation from Table 2 -2 is that approximately 50 percent of the technology competencies from the acquired firms overlap existing Raytheon capabilities. The lightshaded cells in Table 2 -2 in the Raytheon Electronic Systems column highlight Raytheon's pre-existing competencies that were duplicated by competencies present in the acquired firms. This observation does not mean that the overlapping areas lack added value. On the contrary these complementing competencies, if properly managed, reinforce the learning curves and experience of the technical staff.
They also suggest the additions of manufacturing facilities and experienced staff at lower costs.
In general the acquisitions fill many technology gaps for Raytheon. One Raytheon Program
Manager in Ground-Based Radar commented that the acquisition of Texas Instrument DS&E was critical to establishing Raytheon's competence in microelectronics. 7 The DS&E facility is a leader in GalliumArsenide integrated circuits, particularly those used in aircraft radar systems. Raytheon seeks not only to increase the use of these electronic devices in its own products but also to become a primary supplier to other defense industry firms. In fact Northrop Grumman, a competitor to Raytheon that lost the bid for Texas Instruments DS&E, especially coveted TI's integrated circuit facilities and aggressively lobbyed government officials and the Federal Trade Commission to block this part of the acquisition on anti-trust grounds.
Raytheon gained another critical technological competency in electro-optical devices through the acquisitions of both Hughes and TI DS&E. According to a Raytheon Division Chief for National Missile Defense (NMD), Raytheon has traditionally been rather weak in electro-optics, which are needed for on-board infrared missile seekers and other remote sensing equipment. Use of these electro-optic technologies will improve the accuracy of the heat-seeking interceptors that will be developed for the NMD program, and will enhance the homing devices for Raytheon's existing family of missile weaponry.
One final observation from Table 2 -2 is that all 17 of Raytheon's new competencies could have been gained by acquiring just three of the firms: E-Systems, Texas Instruments DS&E, and Hughes
Aircraft. This result clearly underscores the significant technological and strategic value of these three acquisitions to Raytheon. The other acquisitions, however, also add value because they have created market opportunities and have provided marketing and distribution channels, as indicated below.
We next analyze Raytheon's electronics acquisitions by placing each one into the Familiarity Matrix, providing a uniform framework for assessing the acquisitions in terms of their initial market and technology-relatedness to Raytheon. s In general "market familiarity" is a measure of Raytheon's understanding of the customer base and business patterns in the markets served by the acquired companies. Acquisitions that replicate Raytheon's own market experiences are regarded as in Raytheon's "base" market. Those that involve some degree of market change, but with important aspects of market "sameness", are considered to be in a "new (but) familiar" market zone. Acquisitions whose market characteristics are largely different from Raytheon's are seen as "new (and) unfamiliar".
A similar assessment is carried out with respect to the technical similarities between Raytheon and its acquisitions, with the extent of "technology familiarity" reflecting Raytheon's understanding of the core technologies imbedded in each of the acquired companies, based on Raytheon's own internal technical capabilities. 7 Personal interview with Raytheon program manager, 25 April 97. 8 Roberts and Berry, ibid.
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The Familiarity Matrix is constructed with the two axes of technical and market familiarity of the acquisitions relative to Raytheon, using the three measures of base, new familiar, and new unfamiliar on each axis. Figure 2 -2 depicts our assessments of Raytheon's five acquisitions on this grid, now divided by different shading into three overall zones to indicate regions of roughly similar "familiarity".
Within the lower left "base-familiar" zone, acquisitions are assumed to be capable of adding depth to Raytheon's existing skills and knowledge, with only incremental broadening. Empirical studies of acquisition strategies show that such "related acquisitions" tend to become successful additions to the firm. 9 In contrast, if they were located in the upper right "new familiar-new unfamiliar" zone, any acquisitions would be essentially unrelated to Raytheon's core knowledge. While such acquisitions might have the potential of dramatically adding new skills and new market opportunities to the acquiring firm, the research literature indicates that such "unrelated acquisitions" usually fail and are frequently divested. E-Systems is a particularly interesting acquisition. Our analysis of competencies found that ESystems added six entirely new technical capabilities ranging from satellite surveillance, to computer systems management, to unmanned vehicles. As a result E-Systems is categorized as New Unfamiliar
Technology from Raytheon's perspective. On the other axis E-Systems serves a customer base in the government intelligence and surveillance communities. Although these are new markets for Raytheon, the fundamental nature of selling to the government provides some essential familiarity and so brings ESystems into the New Familiar Market region. Thus, based on both market and technology factors, the E-Systems acquisition afforded significant value to Raytheon. The company gained access to valuable new technologies as well as entry into new government markets. The Roberts/Berry arguments highlight the diversity of the E-Systems technologies relative to Raytheon's base capabilities and suggest that Raytheon is itself ill-equipped to integrate E-Systems rapidly into its own core activity. It would appear that Raytheon needs to provide a high degree of independence to the E-Systems management until greater joint learning has taken place. 
I
Xyplex, the acquiring company, Whittaker Corporation, has also failed to achieve any significant benefit, and is now attempting to sell Xyplex.)
The key organizational challenges that will determine Raytheon's ability to unlock the technology value from its acquisitions are: a constructive consolidation of facilities, the careful management of people, and the transfer of technology throughout the enormous new company. In regard to consolidation of facilities, market analysts believe Raytheon might be able to achieve financial efficiencies of approximately 10 percent, or $1.3B, per year.
" However, achieving these savings will require dramatic organizational changes. Raytheon's present organizational structure, depicted in Figure   2 -3, grants a high degree of independence and autonomy to the newly acquired companies. Under this organizational structure, each acquisition has or will become a distinct Raytheon division, reporting directly to the CEO, Dennis J. Picard. Each division is responsible for its own administration, marketing, and core product development. This structure does not enhance Raytheon's overall technology strategy because each division is also independently performing its own research and new product development. Moreover, retaining traditional company boundaries inhibits personal interaction between divisions and retards the transfer of technology and expertise. Raytheon's CFO, Peter D'Angelo, has acknowledged that the company's existing structure is disadvantageous and in order to achieve the desired synergy and efficiency "major changes must occur". ' Alkhough Raytheon has neither publicly nor internally announced formal plans to restructure, our discussions with several Raytheon representatives suggest that there is a general understanding of the reorganization that is being considered. To promote synergy, spread technology, and reap financial savings from economies of scale, the company is expected to reorganize all defense electronics divisions into one business unit. This action will eliminate traditional company barriers and instead organize the company according to functional areas. Raytheon's potential organizational structure is depicted in Figure 2 Raytheon's organizational structure directly involves the second key organizational challengesound management of people. Each of the acquired companies has a very strong corporate culture. Many of the CEOs from these companies remained with their organizations after acquisition by Raytheon. As a result, these companies maintain their own strong identities. Raytheon faces a difficult but necessary personnel and internal marketing challenge to merge these disparate groups into a common Raytheon culture. Restructuring into a functional organization is a marshaling event that will initiate cultural change.
Another difficulty facing Raytheon is how to group individuals and program teams by function when they are dispersed across numerous facilities in more than 14 states and 3 countries. Relocating people is a difficult task. One senior engineer at Raytheon explained that talented engineering and technical people are in very high demand. '3 The rapid growth of high technology industries in California, Texas and Massachusetts enables employees slated for relocation to remain in their local area by joining other local high-tech firms. Our interviews indicated that the market for engineers is so competitive that the RES/Hughes/TI DS&E/E-Systems divisions have a combined personnel shortage of more than 2,000 engineers. As a result, Raytheon representatives believe Raytheon will exploit the latest information technology (IT) techniques to try to achieve a "virtual" organization, rather than a traditional one that is geographically centralized.
The last major organizational challenge is the installation of pervasive practices to stimulate the sharing and transfer of technology and experience throughout the company. Eliminating former company boundaries through functional restructuring is a major step toward this goal. For instance, having all missile developers together, even if it is done virtually through IT, will greatly facilitate the sharing of technology and ideas. In addition, Raytheon plans to increase the practice of personnel interchange. A senior divisional manager lamented that technical people are rarely loaned to other coupled with subsequent collaboration between these facilities and Raytheon's own Advanced Device Center, will greatly enhance the company's capability in microelectronic devices.
2.2
Raytheon: Conclusions.
An examination of Raytheon's five recent acquisitions has provided some insight into the company's technology strategy. The company's recent spate of acquisitions is motivated more by business than by technology. This is not surprising in light of the perceived need to be large in order to continue to participate in the shrinking defense industry (as described in section 1.0). As a result, Raytheon's technology strategy has been dynamic and emergent, often reacting to the acquisitions as they occurred. Restructuring Raytheon along functional lines, even if it becomes a virtual organization, would promote retention of highly valued personnel and enhance internal technology transfer. In addition, a reorganization would likely re-establish a central R&D division. Because Raytheon currently lacks centralized R&D management, the company allocates only 5% of its R&D budget to research and 95% to relatively-near term development. A larger proportion devoted to research would seem more appropriate for a large technology-oriented company that has just acquired many technological resources through acquisitions. as the world's premier system engineering and technology enterprise. Our mission is to build on our aerospace heritage to meet the needs of our customers with high-quality products and services. And, in so doing, produce superior returns for our shareholders and foster growth and achievement for our employees." 14 Although Lockheed has been a continuous growth company in its quest for mission fulfillment, it has taken a more aggressive approach since the 1990s. The chronology of recent mergers and acquisitions by Lockheed is detailed in Table 3 -1.
In the span of approximately 18 months with the merger of Martin Marietta and the acquisition of Loral, the Lockheed Martin Corporation has risen to become the world's largest defense firmnn with defense sales totaling more than $30 billion. And, most recently, in July 1997 it agreed to acquire Northrop Grumman Corporation for $8.3 billion, subject to government approvals. Augustine, say the new company will derive 40 percent of its revenues from non-military markets. "We're committed to defense, and would like to hold the defense part of our business roughly constant,"
said Augustine in an interview with Government Executive. "But our growth will come principally from non-defense. The civilian government is one area we have very much in mind. One, because it's a growing market, and secondly, we know how to do business with the government."
In a second interview, when asked about Lockheed Martin's business strategy for the short term (the next year or so) and the longer term, Augustine replied, "This Corporation has two elements to the strategy that we've been following for a number of years --and it's still the proper strategy for the foreseeable future. The first element has been to build on our defense business, to put ourselves in a very 15 '4 Lockheed Martin 1996 Annual Report.
solid position in terms of market share. We've accomplished that and now we'll seek to benefit from that, particularly as the defense procurement budget begins to turn back up. Our successes in winning new business this past year suggest the soundness of this approach. The second element of our strategy has been to grow into closely related non-defense areas. Now I emphasize closely related. By that I mean things that are high tech, large systems with large customers (like governments or large corporations). And this will be our principle thrust in the next few years --in areas such as telecommunications, information systems, training and simulation, infrastructure support, environmental management, technical services and so on. We have a whole host of capabilities that we can grow into solid businesses." 5 Lockheed Martin's portfolio of defense industry technologies is summarized in Table 3 Relocating some assets would reap economies of scale in manufacturing, and centralize some core R&D investments. Lockheed Martin has a large number of site locations. In order to facilitate the internal sharing of information and technology, Lockheed Martin is using its own expertise in IT to network the corporation. The term "virtual enterprise" literally applies to Lockheed Martin. Through this innovative electronic organizational structure, it is showing that a company of such immense size can take advantage of its larger scale but still compete like a small company.
Lockheed Martin faces many of the same organizational challenges confronting Raytheon: merging disparate cultures, carefully managing people, and consolidating facilities. The major difference between the two is that Lockheed Martin already has an organizational structure based on functional areas of core competence. This strategy has also allowed entry into such commercial markets as information systems.
Assembling such a diverse team from many parts is a cultural challenge. So far, this has not been a serious problem. Lockheed's management states that they are mindful of cultural differences and take them into consideration when matching up the various elements that will make up their corporation.
Management's goal is a seamless organization in which the different business sectors operate as though they are one entity. To do this, Lockheed is creating a virtual enterprise, through which it can reduce the overall cost structure but, more importantly, speed the rate of innovation and stimulate the sharing of technology throughout the company.
Lockheed Martin: Conclusions.
Lockheed Martin has been aggressive in its quest to become the major defense contractor in the world, and to attain competitive advantage in other government and commercial markets. The most recent mergers and acquisitions have been motivated more by the pursuit of "critical mass," but now the company is focusing on its technology strategy. Much vertical integration is apparent, and horizontal integration of companies and technologies is underway.
In February 1997 Lockheed Martin announced a strategic plan to re-engineer its non-core businesses. The reductions in these areas are being offset by employment growth in others. In fact, in its newsletter, Lockheed Martin Today, the company announced a shortage of technical expertise for the first time in many years. Lockheed Martin is hiring at a rate unmatched in a decade. Reflecting the rapid growth of information technology across all industries, Lockheed is looking for people with technical skills in computer science, electrical engineering, and computer engineering.
Lockheed must also address its research and development activities. A rapid pace of acquisitions can have both positive and negative effects upon R&D. Positively, through each acquisition and merger, Lockheed Martin can take advantage of the richness of the acquired expertise and the fresh viewpoints of the technical staff. Negatively, configuring a core R&D capability can be difficult when the assets are spread across so many states. In our discussions with Lockheed executives they expressed their concerns about R&D and admit that more attention is needed in developing that area..
Overall Lockheed continues to focus on closely-related technologies that expand its core competencies in the defense and government business areas. Its acquisitions land mostly near the lowerleft corner of the Familiarity Matrix. As CEO Norman Augustine stressed, it is his intent to pursue only those business opportunities that will enhance Lockheed's capabilities in familiar defense and associated government and commercial markets. His management of his firm's technology via acquisitions follows this path.
Comparison of the Two Companies and General Defense Industry Conclusions.
From our study we see that Raytheon is currently undergoing a metamorphosis; committees are meeting in the executive offices in Lexington, Massachusetts to survey the company's resources, target the markets, and determine the configuration of the new company that will best position Raytheon for the future. Lockheed Martin, on the other hand, is already functionally organized and therefore better positioned to integrate efficiently its acquired assets and more quickly capitalize on strategically valuable new technology and markets. Nonetheless, both Raytheon and Lockheed Martin stand to benefit substantially from the technologies and potential market opportunities that have come along with their acquisitions. In both cases new technologies are introduced, technology gaps are filled, existing capabilities are reinforced, and new business synergies are created. Our comparison of the two companies with respect to our five key attributes of technology strategy is synopsized in Table 5 -1.
In regard to the overall industry the study of Raytheon and Lockheed Martin have provided an interesting perspective on the role and impact of technology strategy in the emerging consolidated defense industry. In addition to consideration of external market influences a successful technology strategy must also address fundamental internal aspects within the company itself. Beyond merging technologies and fixed assets, a technology strategy also depends upon the careful integration of technical people and a restructuring of the organization so that the incoming value can be absorbed and applied in the most advantageous manner.
Raytheon and Lockheed Martin are two major defense industry companies that have resorted to the strategy of mergers and acquisitions to ensure access to critical services, technologies, and components. These actions have also helped to access for these two firms the few alternative markets toward which the enormous capacity of the industry can be redirected as world events continue to change and as defense budgets worldwide continue to decrease. In conclusion we have learned that the corporate and technology strategies of a large defense company are highly intertwined. Corporate decisions are made to ensure survival, to solidify existing lines of business, to develop new business opportunities, and to satisfy shareholders. In the new defense industry, it appears the biggest firms will survive by adopting a technology strategy that integrates acquired capabilities into current product lines and assertively adapts defense technology strengths toward future non-defense market opportunities. Diversifying beyond the boundaries of the defense industry might afford the growth, stability and profitability that the defense markets alone can no longer support. 
